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WHEN CLIENTS SUE THEIR LAWYERS FOR
FAILING TO REPORT THEIR OWN MALPRACTICE
Benjamin P. Cooper*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers, like all professionals, make mistakes.' They blow the
statute of limitations, fail to conduct appropriate factual investigations,
draft inadequate documents, fail to check for and disclose conflicts, and
commit many other kinds of errors.2 Sometimes lawyers recognize their
mistakes but fail to disclose them to their clients. If a lawyer's mistake
(missing the statute of limitations) causes damage to his client (inability
to recover on a meritorious claim), the client can sue the lawyer for legal
malpractice.' What, if any, consequences are there for a lawyer who fails
to disclose his error to his client?
In a previous article, I examined a lawyer's ethical duty to report
his own malpractice to his client-a topic that had previously received
little attention from courts and commentators4-and concluded that the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Frank Montague, Jr. Professor of Legal Studies
and Professionalism, University of Mississippi School of Law. I am grateful to my faculty writing
group (Jack Nowlin, Chris Green, and Mercer Bullard) for their helpful comments and to Scott
DeLeve for excellent research assistance. I presented a draft of this paper at the April 1, 2015
conference, "Lawyers as Targets: Suing, Prosecuting and Defending Lawyers," sponsored by the
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University's Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics
(ISLE). Thank you to Susan Saab Fortney for inviting me to such a wonderful conference and for
providing excellent comments on an earlier draft.
1. Anthony V. Alfieri, Law Firm Malpractice Disclosure: Illustrations and Guidelines, 42
HOFSTRA L. REv. 17, 17 (2013) ("Lawyers err every day, in hard and easy cases, in trials and
transactions, and in large and small firms.").
2. Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice, 34
HOFSTRA L. REv. 689, 698-99 (2006).
3. Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer's Duty to Inform His Client ofHis Own Malpractice, 61
BAYLOR L. REv. 174, 180-81 (2009).
4. See generally id. Other commentators have now contributed additional analysis of the
ethical dimensions of the self-reporting duty. See generally Timothy J. Pierce & Sally E. Anderson,
What to Do After Making a Serious Error, Wis. LAW., Feb. 2010, at 6 (describing the lawyer's
ethical duty to report his own malpractice to his client under the Wisconsin Rules of Professional
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duty is well-grounded in two rules. The first is the lawyer's duty under
Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct ("Model Rules") to
communicate with the client.' The second is the lawyer's duty to avoid
conflicts of interest under Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules.
Just because a lawyer is subject to discipline for failing to report his
own malpractice, however, does not mean that a client can state an
independent claim against the lawyer on that ground. In a small number
of reported decisions, courts have considered such claims, but those
cases are divided and suffer from some of the same analytical flaws that
characterize the broader area of legal malpractice law. This Article
tackles that important question, which Ltouched on only briefly in my
previous article,' and argues that clients should be able to assert such a
claim, separate and apart from the underlying malpractice claim based
on the original error.9 Specifically, clients should be able to assert an
independent breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking equitable remedies,
including fee forfeiture, based on the lawyer's failure to self-report his
error.'o This Article creates a blueprint for courts and practitioners
analyzing such a claim."
To create such a blueprint requires plunging into, and bringing
order to, an untidy corner of legal malpractice law. 2 When a client sues
her lawyer for damages arising out of the lawyer's representation of the
client, she may assert two principal claims-one for professional
negligence, and a second for breach of fiduciary duty." Plaintiffs and
courts frequently lump these together as "legal malpractice" claims,1
Conduct and offering practical tips for what lawyers should do). For an in-depth analysis of law
firm malpractice disclosure disputes, see generally Alfieri, supra note 1.
5.

See generallyCooper, supra note 3, at 213-14. But see 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON

MARTIN RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24:11 (2015 ed.) (stating that "few courts have construed
civil or ethical standards to compel such disclosure in the abstract").
6.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id r. 1.7.
Cooper, supra note 3, at 209-11.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.

11.

See infra PartV.C.

12. See Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of
FiduciaryDuty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1137,1167-68 (1999).
13.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§§

48, 49 (AM. LAW INST.

2000) (entitled "Professional Negligence" and "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," respectively); Cooper,
supra note 3, at 209-10; Wolfram, supra note 2, at 690; see, e.g., Cecala v. Newman, 532 F. Supp.
2d 1118, 1133-35 (D. Ariz. 2007) (recognizing two separate causes of action in legal malpractice
cases in Arizona).
14. Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A
Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 261-64 (1994); see dmcgowan,
Confusion Over Breach of Fiduciary Duty, LEGAL ETHICS F. (Apr. 11, 2007, 12:17 AM),
http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2007/04/confusion-over .html.
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with little thought as to the difference.'I A frequent tactic for aggrieved
clients is to assert overlapping causes of action against attorneydefendants for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
possibly other claims (such as fraud, breach of contract, etc.) arising out
of the same set of facts and seeking the same damages.' 6 For their part,
courts have done a poor job of sorting out these different causes of
action, and, as a result, the doctrines are badly mangled."
This Article joins a burgeoning consensus of commentators and
courts who believe that clients should be able to assert two separate
claims against their lawyers-a professional negligence claim when the
lawyer has breached his duty of care to a client and a breach of fiduciary
duty claim when a lawyer has violated his fiduciary duties of loyalty and
communication to a client."8 Applying this to the failure-to-self-report
scenario, a client is unlikely to be able to assert a professional
negligence claim because the client will typically not be able to establish
any additional injury over and above the damage caused by the
underlying malpractice. In other words, the client will not be able to
satisfy the "case-within-the-case" requirement.
A client should, however, be able to assert a breach of fiduciary
duty claim seeking fee forfeiture. Properly understood, the primary
fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes to a client is the duty of loyalty, and a
lawyer's failure to self-report malpractice constitutes a breach of that
15. Anderson & Steele, supra note 14, at 235 ("The courts . . . are not in agreement on the
exact nature of and parameters for these causes of action. Many refuse to recognize the distinctions
and dichotomies between and among the actions, and conclude that regardless of how the cause is
characterized it is essentially a tort action for malpractice. Such a conclusion, however, is much too
pat."); Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries,53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 553, 586 (2009) ("[I]t appears to
be common practice to include the terms 'negligence and breach of fiduciary duty' in legalmalpractice complaints as near-synonyms, the one following the other without apparent
reflection."); see, e.g., Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 744 (7th
Cir. 2004) ("An attorney's throwing one client to the wolves to save the other is
malpractice[] . . . whatever the plaintiff chooses to call it.").
16. See Buhai, supra note 15, at 585-88.
17. Anderson & Steele, supra note 14, at 261-62; Buhai, supra note 15, at 585 ("The
relationship between [a cause of action for fiduciary duty and a cause of action for professional
negligence] appears to have puzzled some courts and commentators."); Duncan, supra note 12, at
1139 ("[Courts have] done an inadequate job of creating and applying fiduciary law to the attorneyclient relationship. To make matters worse, courts have, at times, failed even to distinguish breach
of fiduciary duty claims from traditional professional negligence claims. The failure of the courts to
discuss and emphasize the distinctions between the two have led to a sloppy body of law .... ");
John Leubsdorf, Legal MalpracticeandProfessionalResponsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 112118 (1995) (noting that courts and commentators have failed to properly distinguish a lawyer's
liability for legal malpractice as opposed to breach of fiduciary duty).
18. See, e.g., Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Law Firm of Richard M. Squire & Assocs.,
LLC, No. 10-1451, 2010 WL 5122003 at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010); Cecala, 532 F. Supp. 2d at
1133-34.
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duty under Rule 1.7, as well as under agency principles. Further, clients
should be able to recover certain equitable remedies-principally fee
forfeiture-even in the absence of proof that the fiduciary breach gave
rise to damages. In most cases, clients should be able to assert this claim,
in addition to a claim for professional negligence, seeking compensatory
damages based on the underlying malpractice.
Part II describes the lawyer's ethical duty to inform his client of his
own malpractice.1 9 Part III illustrates the split of authority among courts
analyzing a client's ability to bring an independent claim against her
lawyer for failure to report his own malpractice.2 0 Parts IV and V
describe the two principal claims that a client can bring against her
lawyer: professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. As set
forth in Part IV, professional negligence claims largely cover (or should
cover) breaches of the lawyer's duty of care, and most clients will not be
able to assert a professional negligence claim for breach of the selfreporting duty because they will be unable to establish any additional
injury over and above the damage caused by the underlying
malpractice.2 1 As set forth in Part V, however, a breach of fiduciary duty
claim should cover a lawyer's breach of his fiduciary duties of loyalty
and communication, and provide for equitable remedies not typically
available for a professional negligence claim.22 Thus, when a
lawyer fails to report his own malpractice, clients should be able to
assert an independent breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking equitable
remedies, including fee forfeiture, based on that failure. Finally, Part VI
discusses other advantages of bringing an independent claim for breach
of fiduciary duty.2 3
II.

THE LAWYER'S ETHICAL DUTY To DISCLOSE
HIS OWN MALPRACTICE

In a previous article, I examined the lawyer's ethical duty to report
his own malpractice to his client and concluded that the duty is wellgrounded in two rules.24 The first is the lawyer's duty under Rule 1.4 to
communicate with the client. This rule provides, in part, that "[a] lawyer
shall . . . keep

the

client

reasonably

informed

about

the

status

of the matter," and "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part fl.
See infra Part ll.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See generally Cooper, supra note 3.
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representation." 25 Although courts and commentators have debated the
proper scope of the lawyer's duty to communicate, 2 6 whatever the
precise scope of this rule, it surely must include a requirement that a
lawyer inform his client when the client may have a substantial
malpractice claim against the lawyer, since this information is
"necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." 27 Those decisions include (1) whether the client has a
viable malpractice claim arising out of the representation and, if so,
whether to pursue it now or later; and (2) whether to have the lawyer
continue to represent the client in the current matter.28 In this situation,
where the interests of the attorney and client may differ substantially, "a
high degree of disclosure" is necessary.29
The second rule that gives rise to the self-reporting duty is Rule 1.7,
governing conflicts of interest. Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client in a variety of situations including when "there is a

25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) ("(1) A lawyer

must keep a client reasonably informed about the matter and must consult with a client to a
reasonable extent concerning decisions to be made by the lawyer. . .. (2) A lawyer must promptly
comply with a client's reasonable requests for information. (3) A lawyer must notify a client of
decisions to be made by the client . .. and must explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
26. Some courts have said that a lawyer owes a duty of "absolute and perfect candor" to the
client. See, e.g., Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, LLP, 22 S.W.3d 857, 867 (Tex. 2000); State ex
rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 4 P.3d 1242, 1254 n.42 (Okla. 2000); Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d
608, 624 (Tex. App. 1987). But, this does not square with the language of Rule 1.4 and the
Restatement, which contain a reasonableness standard. See Vincent R. Johnson, "Absolute and
Perfect Candor" to Clients, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737, 738-39 (2003) (arguing that such a standard
"read literally and without qualification ... cannot possibly be an accurate statement of an
attorney's obligations under all circumstances" because it "would require a lawyer to convey to a
client every piece of data coming into the lawyer's possession, no matter how duplicative, arcane,
unreliable or insignificant"); Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and Therefore
Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 789-92 (2008) (arguing that the lawyer's duty to
communicate should be strengthened and clarified by adding a materiality standard to Rule 1.4).
27. Frances Patricia Solari, Malpractice and Ethical Considerations, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165,
175-76 (1991) (recognizing that the North Carolina rule concerning the duty to "keep the client
reasonably informed" imposes a self-reporting obligation on attorneys); Charles E. Lundberg, SelfReporting Malpracticeor Ethics Problems, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2003, at 24, 24 (recognizing a
self-reporting duty under Minnesota law since "the attorney is under a duty to disclose any material
matters bearing upon the representation and must impart to the client any information which affects
the client's interests"). But see Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof.
Responsibility, Informal Op. 97-56 (1997) (concluding that a lawyer had to inform his client that
her personal injury case had been dismissed for failure to prosecute and the consequences of such a
dismissal, but not that the client may have a claim against him for malpractice).
28. Solari, supra note 27, at 175, 180; see Pierce & Anderson, supra note 4, at 9, 43 (reaching
the same conclusion under Wisconsin Rule 1.4).
29. Johnson, supra note 26, at 773 (recognizing the self-reporting duty as one of these
instances).
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significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by.. . a personal interest of the lawyer." 30
Comment [10] to Rule 1.7 further explains that "[t]he lawyer's own
interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on
representation of a client."" This conflict is imputed to the entire firm.32
Once a lawyer's conduct has given rise to a substantial malpractice
claim by his client, his personal interests are adverse to his client's. 33 It
may not seem, at first blush, as if the lawyer has a conflict, since both
the lawyer and the client have an interest in obtaining a favorable
outcome. But upon closer inspection, it is apparent that the lawyer's
interest is not necessarily aligned with the client's.3 4 The lawyer may be
preoccupied with his own problems: for example, in a litigation context,
he might want to settle the litigation quickly in order to try and hide his
mistake or minimize the damages available to the client in a subsequent
malpractice case. 35 Another possibility is that the lawyer might want to
litigate the case to the end to prove that his (or his law firm's) original
advice was correct while the client's interest is best served by reaching
the quickest and least expensive resolution of the litigation. 6 As I
previously described this situation:
Because of his tunnel vision, the attorney is not in a position to
realistically evaluate the claim asserted against the client or to give
independent legal advice that is in the best interest of the client.
Rather, the conflicted lawyer becomes fixated on vindicating his or
his firm's own position instead of acting in the best interests of
the client. 37

The comments to Rule 1.7 fully support the view that a substantial
mistake by the lawyer creates a conflict: "[I]f the probity of a lawyer's
30.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2).

&

31. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 10.
32. Id. r. 1.10(a).
33. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 16:9 ("A present, threatened or potential claim for
legal malpractice ... can create a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client."); id. § 16:10
("A claim of legal malpractice can create a conflict of interest between lawyer and client, resulting
in a loss of confidence for the client and impairing the lawyer's independent judgment."); Pierce
Anderson, supra note 4, at 8 (reaching the same conclusion under Wisconsin Rule 1.7); Brian
Pollock, Surviving a Screwup, LIIG., Winter 2008, at 19, 21.
34. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 16:10 ("A self-protective instinct may result in a
lawyer's representational activities being subconsciously, or even deliberately, directed to reduce
the prospect of liability. Candor may be replaced by caveat. Creativity may yield to caution and
conservatism. Even the lawyer's ability to function as an advocate and demeanor may be
affected."); Pollock, supranote 33, at 21.
35. Pollock, supra note 33, at 21.
36. Id.
37. Cooper, supranote 3, at 185.
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own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or
impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice."I' In short, a
lawyer who fails to disclose his malpractice to his client is subject to
discipline for violating Rules 1.4 and 1.7.39
One of the most challenging aspects for the lawyer is figuring out
which mistakes trigger the self-reporting requirement. 40 If a lawyer
commits a clear error that causes significant harm to the client for
example, if the lawyer fails to file his client's complaint in time to meet
the statute of limitations-the lawyer must report this mistake to the
client. 4 1 On the other hand, certain minor mistakes-such as filing a
brief containing a typo-do not require self-reporting.4 2 Similarly, if the
lawyer can rectify the mistake or the mistake causes no significant
consequences for the client, then the lawyer has nothing to communicate
and no conflict to worry about.43 As noted in a formal opinion issued by
the Colorado Bar Association: "In between these two ends of the
spectrum are innumerable errors that do not fall neatly into either end of
the spectrum and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.""
The test for determining what errors to report is materialitylawyers should report material mistakes.45 Materiality is a familiar
concept in the law arising in such diverse contexts as fraud, criminal
procedure, federal securities law, and health care law. The gist of
38.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013); Solari, supra

note 27, at 180 ("Once it has become apparent that a client may have a malpractice claim against the
attorney, the attorney clearly has a stake in the outcome of the case, and the lawyer's representation
'may be materially limited . .. by his own interests."').
39. In addition, the lawyer's failure to disclose his own malpractice may also violate Rule
8.4(c)'s prohibition on conduct involving, among other things, "dishonesty" and "deceit." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c). Thank you to Susan Fortney for this suggestion.
40. SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS

AND PREVENTION 422 (2008) (describing this decision as a "formidable task").
41. Cooper, supra note 3, at 181; Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 (2005)
("At one end are errors that . .. will likely prejudice a client's right or claim.").
42. Pollock, supra note 33, at 20-21 ("Not every mistake by a lawyer, however, will create a
conflict of interest. If a mistake can be corrected (e.g., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) permits
blown deadlines to be extended upon a showing of 'excusable neglect') or has no meaningful
consequences for the client (e.g., the loss of a duplicative claim or defendant), no conflict of interest
exists between lawyer and client because their interests do not diverge." (citation omitted));
Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 ("At the other end of the spectrum are errors
and possible errors that may never cause harm to the client, either because any resulting harm is not
reasonably foreseeable, there is no prejudice to the client's right or claim, or the lawyer takes
corrective measures that are reasonably likely to avoid any such prejudice.").
43. Pollock, supra note 33, at 20-21.
44. Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113.
45. FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 110 ("Courts have repeatedly recognized that the
fiduciary obligations of an attorney require disclosure of facts that are material to the representation.
The implication of these expressions is that immaterial facts need not be disclosed."); Cooper, supra
note 3, at 194-98.
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materiality in these different contexts is much the same, however.
Drawing on the standard in these other contexts, Professor Eli Wald
concludes that lawyers must "reveal all information that a reasonable
client would attach importance to in determining the objectives of the
representation." 4 6 In the event of mistakes, Professor Wald concludes
that "the fact that a lawyer made a mistake in representing a client will
ordinarily not be material," but if the mistake "has consequences that
materially affect the client's matter, the fact of the mistake becomes
material, and must be disclosed to the client."' Applying this
understanding of materiality, the self-reporting duty should arise
"when the error is one that a reasonable client would find significant in
making decisions about (1) the lawyer-client relationship and (2) the
continued representation by the lawyer or law firm." 4 8 As applied to the
self-reporting duty, materiality comes down to primarily two things: how
bad was the mistake and how much harm did it cause.49 At the end
of the day, figuring out what is material for purposes of the selfreporting duty is not an easy task, and lawyers will have to make
difficult judgment calls.so
III.

EXISTING CASE LAw ADDRESSING A LAWYER'S FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE HIS OwN MALPRACTICE

There have been surprisingly few reported cases in which a client
has attempted to assert a separate claim against the lawyer based on the
lawyer's failure to report his own malpractice. There are several possible
reasons. First, the client has relatively little incentive to pursue this
secondary claim if she stands to collect a significant damages award for
the underlying malpractice. Second, the client may never learn about the
malpractice because the lawyer failed to report it to her. There are many
possible reasons for the lawyer's failure to self-report. The lawyer may
not believe he or his firm has committed malpractice or may otherwise
be unaware that he or his firm has committed an act of malpractice." He
46. Wald, supra note 26, at 781.
47. Id at 791.
48. Cooper, supranote 3, at 214.
49. Pollock, supra note 33, at 21 ("How clear cut is it that the lawyer was negligent? Can the
error be remedied without harm to the client? How severe are the potential consequences of the
mistake for the client? These factors boil down to the same ultimate question: What is the likelihood
of a substantial malpractice claim against the lawyer as a result of the mistake in question?").
50. Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 (2005) ("In between these two ends
of the spectrum are innumerable errors that do not fall neatly into either end of the spectrum and
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.").
51. Cooper, supra note 3, at 188 ("The lawyer's natural (and human) inclination
is to assume that his or his partner's work was competent and was not the cause of the
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may be unaware of his duty to report his malpractice.5 2 He may want to
try to fix the error. A more sinister explanation is that the lawyer has
decided to intentionally hide his mistake from his client."
Whatever the reason, the small number of existing decisions are
divided and suffer from some of the same analytical flaws that
characterize the broader area of legal malpractice law. In several cases,
clients have successfully stated a claim against their lawyers for failure
to self-report. An excellent example is Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v.
Law Firm of Richard M Squire & Associates, LLC.5 4 In that case, the
lawyer failed to file a petition to fix the fair value of the relevant
property in a foreclosure action, thereby depriving the client of the
opportunity to pursue a deficiency judgment." The lawyer then failed to
tell the client about this error." On these facts, the court permitted the
plaintiff to proceed with a claim for professional negligence," based on
the lawyer's failure to file the petition to fix the fair value," and a breach
of fiduciary duty claim, based on the defendant's alleged disloyalty for
failing to disclose his errors to his client.59
The court in Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P.60 also
allowed the client to pursue a claim based, at least in part, on the
dispute that has surfaced.").
52. Daniel M. Serviss, The Evolution of the "Entire Controversy" Doctrine and Its Enduring
Effects on the Attorney-Client Relationship: What a Long Strange Trip It Has Been, 9 SETON HALL

CONsT. L.J. 779, 781 (1999) (noting the obligation to advise a client of her malpractice "perhaps
eludes many practicing attorneys").
53. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 725 (1990) (concluding based
on interviews of attorneys that "[o]ne of the most common reasons that lawyers deceive clients is to
avoid having to disclose their mistakes"); Steven Wechsler, Professional Responsibility, 52
SYRACUSE L. REv. 563, 610 (2002) ("The natural, human reaction of a lawyer who makes a serious
mistake in his or her representation of a client is to hide that embarrassing fact, while trying to
correct the problem.").
54. No. 10-1451, 2010 WL 5122003 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010).
55.

Id. at *1.

56. Id. at *5.
57. The court described the claim as a "legal malpractice claim sounding in negligence." Id.
at *3.
58. Id
59. Id at *5. In Bayview Loan Servicing, the "plaintiffs assert[ed] that defendants attempted
to hide their lapse by failing to inform plaintiffs that they had missed the deadline for filing a
petition to fix fair value, informing [the judge] that they did not object to marking the judgment
satisfied without consulting plaintiffs, failing to inform plaintiffs that the judgment was marked
satisfied, and continuing to press the deficiency despite knowing it was unmeritorious." Id. The
plaintiffs did not appear, however, to request fee forfeiture or other equitable remedies, and the
court stated that "to recover on the theory that defendants' acts subsequent to their failure to file a
petition to fix fair value were disloyal, plaintiffs will have to prove that such actions were 'a real
factor in bring[ing] about plaintiff[s'] injuries."' Id. (quoting Meyers v. Sudfeld, No. Civ.A.052970, 2006 WL 401855, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006)).
60. 97 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App. 2002).
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lawyer's failure to self-report. In that case, the client claimed that the
law firm failed to disclose its conflict of interest, failed to withdraw from
representing the client in light of that conflict, and failed to counsel the
client to retain separate counsel because of the conflict.6 ' The court
found that the client had stated a cognizable claim for breach of
fiduciary duty and that it was not a "fractured" negligence claim.62
Other courts in Texas, however, have found that a client could not
proceed with a separate claim asserting that the lawyer failed to disclose
his malpractice.63
The Louisiana courts are similarly divided. In one case, the court
permitted a client to proceed with a claim-albeit denominated as a
"legal malpractice" claim-based on her lawyer's failure to notify her
that the medical review panel concluded that the statute of limitations
had run.' The court permitted her claim for emotional damages even in
the absence of other damages." Subsequent Louisiana decisions have
not followed this decision, however.6 6
The New York courts have definitively rejected claims asserting an
independent claim based on an attorney's failure to disclose his own
malpractice. In most of those cases, clients have attempted to state a
claim for fraud, but as one representative New York court stated:
"Plaintiffs fraud claim was properly dismissed, as an attorney's failure
to disclose malpractice does not give rise to a fraud claim separate from
the customary malpractice action." 67

&

61. Id. at 187.
62. Id. at 189-91; see also Riverwalk CY Hotel Partners, Ltd. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
Feld, LLP 391 S.W.3d 229, 237-39 (Tex. App. 2012) (finding the client's claims that the lawyer
intentionally failed to tender the defense to the insurance carrier and charged excessive fees stated a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty and were not fractured negligence claims).
63. See, e.g., Brescia v. Slack & Davis, LLP, No. 03-08-00042, 2010 WL 4670322, at *12
(Tex. App. 2010) (affirming dismissal of the client's cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
because the client's claims that the law firm failed to "properly advise, inform and communicate"
about the case constituted claims for professional negligence); Kahlig v. Boyd, 980 S.W.2d 685,
689 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding the client's claim that his lawyer's affair with his current wife during
a child custody dispute with his ex-wife created a conflict of interest the lawyer was required to
disclose was really a "disguised malpractice claim[]" because the client was really claiming that,
once the affair started, the lawyer was not representing the client to the best of his abilities).
64. Beis v. Bowers, 649 So. 2d 1094, 1096 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
65. Id. at 1097.
66. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Washington & Wells, LLC, 86 So. 3d 666, 671-72 (La. Ct. App.
2012).
67. Weiss v. Manfredi, 639 N.E.2d 1122, 1124 (N.Y. 1994). The New York Court of Appeals
decision in Weiss cites Simcuski v. Saeli, 377 N.E.2d 713, 718 (N.Y. 1978), a medical malpractice
case reaching the same conclusion. Weiss, 639 N.E.2d at 1124; see also Kaiser v. Van Houten, 785
N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (App. Div. 2004) (reaching the same conclusion in a case where plaintiffs appear
to be attempting to plead around a time barred professional negligence claim); Boyd v. Gering,
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Similarly, a New York state trial court relied on the same line of
cases to dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim alleging a failure to
disclose malpractice. 68 In that case, the Supreme Court of New York
County said:
The claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based on the same operative
facts that formed the basis of the malpractice cause of action.
Specifically, both claims are based upon Pryor Cashman's alleged
failure to properly identify the risk of common-law copyright
infringement, and based upon Pryor Cashman's purportedly
affirmative advice that there was no copyright protection. Thus, both
claims allege defects in Pryor Cashman's professional conduct and
claim the same injury. Therefore, the claim for breach of fiduciary duty
is duplicative of the malpractice claim. 69
In another case, a federal district court in New York also dismissed
a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on a failure to disclose
malpractice.7 0 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York found as follows: "Because Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty
claim is premised on the same conduct and seeks the same relief as its
2004 malpractice claim, it is barred under New York law."'
IV.

PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST LAWYERS

When a client sues her lawyer for damages arising out of the
lawyer's representation of the client, she may assert two principal
claims-one for professional negligence and a second for breach of
fiduciary duty.72 Plaintiffs and courts frequently lump these together as
"legal malpractice" claims 73 with little thought as to the difference.74 A
Gross & Gross, 641 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (App. Div. 1996); Country Club Partners, LLC v. Goldman,
No. 2370-09, 2009 WL 8629062, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2009).
68. HHN Int'l, Ltd. v. Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn LLP, No. 150024-06, 2008 WL
763383, at *6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 2008).
69. Id.
70. MIG, Inc. v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 518, 532
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
71. Id; see also id. ("New York law holds that, where a breach of contract or breach of
fiduciary duty claim is premised on the same facts and seeks relief identical to that sought in a legal
malpractice cause of action, such claims are redundant and should be dismissed."). A leading legal
malpractice treatise also concludes:
[T]here is no civil cause of action for a lawyer's failure to confess legal malpractice,
which consists simply of nondisclosure of prior negligent conduct, unless there was an
independent tort or risk of additional injury. Typically, the damage is caused by the
original negligence and not contributed to or enhanced by the nondisclosure.
3 MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 5,

72.
73.

§ 24:11.

See supra note 13.
dmcgowan, supranote 14.
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frequent tactic for aggrieved clients is to assert overlapping causes of
action against attorney-defendants for professional negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and possibly other claims (such as fraud, breach of
contract, and others) arising out of the same set of facts and seeking the
same damages.7 s For their part, courts have done a poor job of sorting
out these different causes of action, and, as a result, the doctrines are
badly mangled.76 This Part sets forth the law governing professional
negligence claims and demonstrates that most clients will not be able to
assert a professional negligence claim for breach of the self-reporting
duty because they will not be able to establish any additional injury
over and above the damage caused by the underlying malpractice.7 7 In
other words, the client will not be able to satisfy the "case-within-thecase" requirement.
Professional negligence is the dominant cause of action asserted by
aggrieved clients.7 ' Although there remain doctrinal areas of
"controversy and imperfections," the professional negligence action is
"relatively well accepted by lawyers .. . as both a necessary concomitant
of professional practice and a relatively workable and fair method of
allocating the risks and consequences of lawyers' failures to act
competently in representing their clients." 9
The law of negligence "provides a remedy for plaintiffs who have
sustained a compensable injury caused by a defendant's failure to use
due care."so In other words, clients can generally sue lawyers for failing
to act as the reasonably prudent lawyer would under the circumstances."
In order to establish a claim for professional negligence, a client must
generally establish (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship
74.

See supra note 15.

75.

See Buhai, supra note 15, at 585-88.

76.

See supra note 17.

77. See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
78. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 696 ("The doctrinal glue that holds that litigational enterprise
together and tests a client's right to recover is the branch of the law of non-intentional economic
injury commonly referred to as legal malpractice.").
79. Id. at 699.
80. Duncan, supra note 12, at 1141.
81.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 52(1)

(AM. LAW INST. 2000)

("[A] lawyer who owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and diligence normally
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances."); FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 101 ("A
plaintiff must prove that the defendant lawyer failed to do what every ordinary, reasonable, prudent
lawyer must do, or did what such a lawyer may not do."); Anderson & Steele, supra note 14, at 245
("[W]hen the attorney's performance falls short of that expected of an ordinary, reasonably prudent
lawyer, the attorney is guilty of the tort of malpractice."); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 696-97 ("Legal
malpractice basically, and in many details, embodies the now traditional professional negligence
claim in this instance, liability for failure to conduct oneself as would a lawyer of ordinary care and
prudence in the same or similar circumstances.").
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(duty); (2) a failure of the attorney to exercise reasonable skill,
knowledge, and diligence of a similarly situated lawyer (breach); (3) that
the attorney's negligence proximately caused injury to the client
(causation); and (4) damages. 82
If a client sues her lawyer for failing to report his own malpractice,
the client should be able to establish the first two elements of a
professional negligence claim in most jurisdictions, but is unlikely to be
able to establish causation and damages. A lawyer obviously has a duty
to her client because of the attorney-client relationship. In establishing a
breach of duty, clients can look to a lawyer's violation of the applicable
rules of professional conduct. Although the Model Rules state that a
"[v]iolation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action
against a lawyer nor ... create any presumption in such a case that a
legal duty has been breached," they go on to provide that "since the
Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation
of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of
conduct." 83 Most jurisdictions "treat as actionable negligence any claim
that a lawyer caused harm to the client through a breach of almost all of
the provisions of the applicable lawyer code governing the lawyer's
conduct." 84 In other words, client-plaintiffs, in most jurisdictions, are
allowed to present evidence that the attorney-defendant breached the
applicable lawyer code," usually through expert testimony.86 The scope

82.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 30

(W. Page

Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (stating that the traditional elements of a negligence claim are "(1) a duty
[] recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct ... [; (2)]
a breach of the duty ... [; (3)] a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury . .. [; and (4)} actual loss or damage to the interests of another"); see also Hughes v.
Consol-Pa. Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1991) ("To establish legal malpractice under
Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs must show three elements: (1) employment of the attorney or other
basis for a duty owed to the client; (2) failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge; and (3) the attorney's negligence proximately caused damage to the client."); DePape v.
Trinity Health Sys., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 585, 608 (N.D. Iowa 2003) ("In a legal malpractice case,
the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the existence of an attorney client relationship giving rise to a
duty, (2) the attorney, either by an act or failure to act, violated or breached that duty, (3) the
attorney's breach of duty proximately caused injury to the client, and, (4) the client sustained actual
injury, loss, or damage.").
83.
84.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. [ 20 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
Wolfram, supra note 2, at 699-700; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING

LAWYERS § 52 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2000); Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partnersas Their
Brothers'Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 235 (2007) ("In suits against lawyers, plaintiffs and courts may
rely on ethics rules to establish the standard of care, rendering irrelevant any perceived distinction
between law firm partners' supervisory duties as 'ethical' rather than 'legal."').
85.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 52

cmt. g. But see Hizey v.

Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (holding that an expert could rely on lawyer
codes in giving testimony, but the expert could not mention reliance on lawyer code to the jury).
86. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 697 ("[It has now become quite well settled-apparently in
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of the duty is broad" and can even include claims "that lawyers caused
harm because of a wrongful conflict of interest.""
Applying this analysis to the lawyer's failure to report his own
malpractice, there is a breach of duty based on the lawyer's violation of
Rule 1.4 or Rule 1.7 or both, as described in the previous section.8 9 Even
in jurisdictions that decline to permit evidence that the lawyer breached
the jurisdiction's rules of professional conduct, the client should still be
able to establish that the lawyer breached professional duties of
communication and loyalty since those duties predate the rules of
professional conduct.
The problem the client will face with her negligence claim is that
she will be unable to satisfy the elements of causation and damages. 90 A
client can only win a negligence claim if she can prove actual harm.'
Negligence law "does not provide a remedy for the violation of a
technical right without supporting damages." 92 This is a "notoriously"
difficult element for malpractice plaintiffs to satisfy because they
typically must prove that they "would have been successful in the
underlying case but for the attorney's lack of care." 93 Courts and
commentators frequently refer to this as proving the "case within-thecase." 94 Although the client might be able to prove compensable injury
in her underlying malpractice claim, in most cases, the lawyer's
failure to report his own malpractice is unlikely to have caused
any additional injury over and above the damage caused by the
underlying malpractice. 95 For that reason, the client is unlikely to

every jurisdiction-that, except in rare cases where breach of duty is either admitted by the
defending lawyer or clearly established on the record, the client is required to prove the element of
breach of duty through the testimony of one or more expert witnesses.").
87. Id. at 698 ("The scope of the grounds that a client might invoke to prove breach of duty in
a negligence claim is vast, encompassing most of the duties of lawyers spelled out in the lawyer
codes and as generally understood and practiced by those mythical lawyers of ordinary care and
prudence whose activities supposedly set the standard for negligence.").
88. Id. at 699.
89. See supraPart I.
90. Jurisdictions differ on the standard for causation. The majority of jurisdictions require that
the client prove the lawyer's professional negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing the
client's loss. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 697-98. Some states impose a "strict test" under which
clients must establish that "but for the professional negligence of the defending lawyer, the client
would have been measurably better off." Id at 697.
91. Duncan, supra note 12, at 1145 ("The plaintiff may only recover compensation for actual
loss suffered.").
92. Id. at 1145; see also id. ("A lack of injury is fatal to any negligence claim.").
93. Id. at 1143-44.
94. Id. at 1144.
95. See supra note 71.
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succeed with a professional negligence claim arising out of the failure to
self-report malpractice.
V.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DuTY CLAIMS AGAINST LAWYERS

The other claim that an aggrieved client is likely to bring against
her lawyer is for breach of fiduciary duty. The breach of fiduciary duty
claim, which originated in the courts of equity," has a decidedly
different historical pedigree than professional negligence, which is an
action at law. While professional negligence claims against lawyers only
gained prominence in the last half-century or so," breach of fiduciary
duty claims are much older." This "accident of legal history" is arguably
to blame for the perplexing state of the law.99
Although the breach of fiduciary duty doctrine lacks the clarity of
professional negligence doctrine, 100 a client suing her lawyer for failing
to self-report his malpractice should be able to state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. This Part first discusses the consensus view that lawyers
are fiduciaries before turning to the indeterminate doctrine concerning
the ability of a client to sue a lawyer for breach of fiduciary duty."0 1 I
then argue that clients should be able to assert two separate claims
against their lawyers-a professional negligence claim when the lawyer
has breached his duty of care to the client, and a breach of fiduciary duty
claim when the lawyer has violated his fiduciary duties of loyalty and
communication to the client.102 Thus, when a lawyer fails to report his
own malpractice, clients should be able to assert an independent breach
of fiduciary claim seeking equitable remedies based on that failure.
A.

Lawyer as Fiduciary

Although courts and commentators dispute whether and under what
circumstances clients should be able to bring breach of fiduciary claims
against their lawyers, 10 everybody agrees that lawyers are fiduciaries.1
96. Duncan, supra note 12, at 1148; Wolfram, supra note 2, at 704-05 (discussing the history
of fiduciary claims against lawyers); see also Buhai, supranote 15, at 555-60 (discussing the history
of fiduciary law and lawyers as fiduciaries).
97. Charles W. Wolfram, Towarda History of the Legalization ofAmerican Legal Ethics-II
the Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 214-16 (2002) (discussing the surge of legal
malpractice actions against lawyers beginning in the 1960s).
98. Buhai, supranote 15, at 555-56.
99. Wolfram, supranote 2, at 720-21.
100. Id. at 706 (stating that the "fiduciary breach doctrine lacks coherence and is far from
settled").
101. See infra Part V.A-B.
102. See infra Part V.C.
103. See infra Part V.C.
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A comment to the section of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers (or "Restatement") that describes the lawyer's duties to a client
even begins with the statement: "A lawyer is a fiduciary.""0 ' The
fiduciary concept originated in the English chancery courts in the laws
of trust and agency."o0 As stated by Marc A. Rodwin: "The law defines a
fiduciary as a person entrusted with power or property to be used for the
benefit of another and legally held to the highest standard of conduct.""o 7
A lawyer, like all fiduciaries, "must exercise the utmost good faith in his
dealings with [the client], make full and honest disclosure of material
facts and refrain from taking any advantage of that party.""os In the
specific context of the attorney-client relationship, a leading casebook
describes lawyers as owing the client the "'5C' fiduciary duties""client control [over the representation], communication, competence,
confidentiality, and conflict of interest resolution,"' all of which are
memorialized in the Model Rules."o The law imposes these fiduciary
duties-and the "highest standard of conduct"-on lawyers because of
their special training, knowledge, and expertise."' That knowledge and
104. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1 (1986) ("[T]he designation of
'fiduciary' . . . surely attaches to the [attorney-client] relationship."); Lester Brickman, The
Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection:Ethics 2000's Revision of Model Rule
1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1191 (describing the lawyer as the "quintessential fiduciary");
Duncan, supra note 12, at 1153 ("It is without question that lawyers are fiduciaries to
their clients.").
105.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

16 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
106. Brickman, supra note 104, at 1186-87; Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary
Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a ChangingHealth Care System, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 241, 243 (1995).
107. Rodwin, supra note 106, at 243.
108. Brickman, supra note 104, at 1184.
109. SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. Fox, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD:
PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 75 (2d ed. 2008); see also In re Cooperman,

633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) (stating that lawyers have the "duty to deal fairly, honestly and
with undivided loyalty [that] superimposes onto the attorney-client relationship a set of special and
unique duties, including maintaining confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, operating
competently, safeguarding client property and honoring the client's interests over the lawyer's"
(citations omitted)); Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers
Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 n.21 (1993) (noting lawyers' fiduciary duties to clients include
"maintaining confidentiality; maintaining undivided loyalty; avoiding conflicts of interest; operating
competently; presenting information and advice honestly and freely; acting fairly; and safeguarding
client property").
I10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 (AM. BAR Ass'N
2013).
111. WOLFRAM, supra note 104, at 145-46 (discussing lawyers' "special skills and knowledge
not generally shared by people and which it would be uneconomic for most people who are not
themselves lawyers to attempt to acquire"); Rodwin, supranote 106, at 243; Wolfram, supra note 2,
at 705 ("Agents, such as lawyers, who are subject to fiduciary duties are at least generally
identifiable as those persons who have undertaken to protect important interests of the principal
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expertise puts lawyers "in a position to exert undue power and
influence" over clients."i 2
Courts use soaring rhetoric (sometimes in Latin) in talking about
the fiduciary duties of lawyers. The relationship "between attorney and
client is a fiduciary relation of the very highest character, and binds the
attorney to the most conscientious fidelity-uberrimafides.""' One
court described uberrimafides as meaning the "'most abundant good
faith,' requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness and honesty, and
the absence of any concealment or deception."'ll4 As a result of this
soaring language, clients see a distinct tactical advantage in trying to
assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim against their lawyer."
B.

The IncoherentDoctrine

Although courts and commentators agree that lawyers are in a
fiduciary relationship with clients, the courts are divided over whether
clients can assert a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against
their lawyers,"' and they take a wide variety of approaches in
addressing this issue." 7 The case law is decidedly "sloppy""' and
suffers from a number of analytical flaws." 9

when the circumstances of the relationship indicate that the principal is vulnerable to abuse by the
agent because the undertaking confers significant discretion on the agent and, hence, power over the
principal's property or other valuable resources.").
112. Brickman, supra note 104, at 1185.
113. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341 (Ct. App. 1998); see also
Matza v. Matza, 627 A.2d 414, 423 (Conn. 1993) ("The relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith."); Tante v. Herring, 439 S.E.2d 5, 10 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1993) (the fiduciary duties of a lawyer entail "applying his best skill, zeal, and
diligence ... [and] exercise[ing] the utmost good faith and loyalty ... and [acting] solely for [the
client's] benefit").
114. Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App. 1991); see also Singleton v.
Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that lawyers must act with the highest "degree
of honesty, forthrightness, loyalty and fidelity").
115. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 5, § 15:3 ("A breach of loyalty sounds more 'wrongful'
than a breach of the standard of care."); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 706.
116.

Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the

Attorney Advisor's Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 289 (2011).
117.

See 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 5,

§

15:3.

118. Duncan, supra note 12, at 1139.
119. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 710 ("[T]here is no general agreement about which lawyer
activities are included within the scope of fiduciary breach and which are not, or about why
included activities are not adequately addressed by the theory of negligence. The authorities are
redolent with the notion that the fiduciary breach theory is more limited than the action for
negligence, but offer little meaningful guidance beyond that.").
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One major area of disagreement among the courts is whether a
client can assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim arising out of the same
set of facts as the client's professional negligence claim. Some courts
allow these essentially duplicative claims,120 but other courts refuse to
allow clients to proceed with a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where
the "operative facts" are the same as those underlying the client's claim
for professional negligence.' 2 ' This latter group seems hesitant to
"unleash fiduciary breach"'2 2 and reasons that "when the basis for a
claim of fiduciary breach arises from the same facts and seeks the same
relief as a negligence claim, such a claim becomes redundant and
therefore it should be dismissed."'2 3 The Texas courts have even
developed a special term for such a claim: a "fractured professional
negligence claim." 2 4 One court describes the doctrine as follows: "The
anti-fracturing rule prevents plaintiffs from converting what are actually
professional negligence claims against an attorney into other claims,
such as fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or violations
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act." 25 When the breach of
fiduciary duty claim arises out of different facts, however, these courts
generally permit a distinct breach of fiduciary duty claim.1 26
120. Id. at 699 ("[T]he allowable areas of allowable client recovery through the negligence
action encompass almost all (but not quite all) claims that courts also allow clients to assert under
the fiduciary breach theory."); see id at 690 (describing the breach of fiduciary duty doctrine as
standing on "equal and firm merits as a basis for recovery," permitting "a legal-malpractice
plaintiff' to "enjoy the option of pursuing either theory . . . or both theories simultaneously").
121. See, e.g., Pippen v. Pederson & Houpt, 986 N.E.2d 697, 704-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013);
Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997) ("If the alleged breach can be characterized as
both a breach of the standard of care (legal malpractice based on negligence) and a breach of a
fiduciary obligation (constructive fraud), then the sole claim is legal malpractice."); Weil, Gotshal
& Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (App. Div. 2004)
("As to the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, we have consistently held that such a claim, premised
on the same facts and seeking the identical relief sought in the legal malpractice cause of action, is
redundant and should be dismissed."); Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App. 2007)
("Texas courts do not allow plaintiffs to convert what are really negligence claims into claims
for ... breach of fiduciary duty.").
122. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 704 (attributing the courts' hesitance to fiduciary duty's "broad
rhetorical sweep, its indeterminate application as doctrine, its forensic volatility, and its overall
potential to extend lawyer liability far beyond what otherwise well-settled legal-malpractice theory
and practice would support").
123. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 15:3; see Michael L. Shakman et al., Why Claims
Against Lawyers for Breach of FiduciaryDuty Are Becoming Extinct, CBA REc., Jan. 2012, at 28,
29 (analyzing recent Illinois cases in which the courts dismissed duplicative fiduciary duty claims).
124. See, e.g., Echols v. Gulledge & Sons, LLC, No. 10-13-00419, 2014 WL 4629056, at *4-5
(Tex. App. Sept. 11, 2014).
125. Id. at *4.
126. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 5, § 15:3. But see Beare v. Yarbrough, 941 S.W.2d 552,
557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to allow a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on a different set
of facts where plaintiff alleged no additional injury).
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In addition to this split on whether clients should be able to assert
"duplicative" breach of fiduciary duty claims, the opinions themselves
contain a number of analytical flaws. First, some courts simply do not
bother to engage in a careful analysis of whether a claim is for
professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. For instance, in
Hoagland ex rel. Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von
Gontard, P.C., the Seventh Circuit failed to distinguish whether the
claim was for breach of fiduciary duty or professional negligence and
was content, instead, to describe the claim as one for "legal
malpractice."' 27 Second, some courts simply describe the lawyer's
fiduciary obligations as part of the standard of care in a claim
denominated as a "negligence" or "legal malpractice" claim.' 2 8 Third,
courts often "discuss a cause of action for breach of 'fiduciary duty'
without specifying the components of the cause of action or the fiduciary
obligations involved."' 29 Fourth, courts sometimes state that negligence
involves a breach of the standard of "care," while breach of fiduciary
duty claims involve a breach of a standard of "conduct," but do not offer
much practical explanation as to what this distinction means.1o
C.

Toward a CoherentDoctrine

Although the case law remains jumbled, commentators have
attempted to clean up that mess, and some courts have followed this
approach. As set forth in this subpart, a sound approach is to recognize a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against lawyers in at least some limited
number of situations, including circumstances where the lawyer acts
disloyally to the client and the client seeks traditional equitable remedies
(that is, not compensatory damages).
Professor Charles Wolfram wrote a leading article on the subject in
which he distinguished between two branches of the fiduciary breach
doctrine: (1) claims that "stand[] as a companion theory to negligence,"
which he describes as the "'equal claims' application of fiduciary breach
theory;" and (2) claims that seek equitable remedies, such as fee
127. Hoagland ex rel. Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385
F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2004) ("An attorney's throwing one client to the wolves to save the other is
malpractice[] . . . whatever the plaintiff chooses to call it.").
128. Smith v. First Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., 575 S.E.2d 419, 432 (W. Va. 2002) (approving a
jury instruction stating that "the duty to exercise reasonable care that [the lawyers owed to the
client] included a duty of loyalty and a duty of candor"); 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 5, § 15:3
("In defining the tort of legal malpractice, one approach is to include the fiduciary obligations
within the standard of care.").
129. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 5, § 15:3.
130. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 711; see Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C., 110 A.3d 575,
582 n.4 (D.C. 2015).
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disgorgement and imposition of a constructive trust.' 31 With respect to
the "equal claims" version of the fiduciary breach doctrine, Professor
Wolfram made the compelling case that courts should do away with this
"companion theory to negligence" because it "produces a needless
proliferation of theories of recovery."l32 In Professor Wolfram's view,
such theory proliferation adds nothing and should be resisted in all areas
of
law,' 3
but
particularly
in
this
doctrinal
area
where allowing clients to assert a duplicative fiduciary duty is
unfairly prejudicial to defendants because of the soaring rhetoric of
fiduciary law. 13 4
Professor Wolfram would, however, allow breach of fiduciary duty
clams in certain "areas in which the fiduciary breach theory has become
well-accepted by traditional and now routine application."' These areas
include claims for disgorgement of profits that a lawyer gained from an
impermissible business transaction with a client, situations where the
lawyer has misused the client's confidential information to benefit
himself, and intentional acts that inflict harm on clients.' 6 Professor
Wolfram also would permit breach of fiduciary duty claims in two
emerging areas: (1) former-client conflict claims; and (2) claims against
lawyers who enter into a sexual relationship with a client during the
representation.'"
In a thoughtful blog post, Professor David McGowan largely
endorsed Professor Wolfram's view and offered this simple formula:
1.
2.

Fiduciary duties are duties that only fiduciaries owe[.]
(a) Duties that non-fiduciaries owe but which fiduciaries owe as
well are not "fiduciary" duties[.]
Many people (perhaps most) owe duties to act carefully in doing
different things[.]

131. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 692-93.
132. Id. at 728; see id. at 692 ("[Fliduciary breach claims are problematic precisely because
of their almost complete and useless overlap with available claims of negligence."). But see
Buhai, supra note 15, at 554 (arguing that "the lawyer's role as fiduciary has been inappropriately
deemphasized").
133. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 728-29.
134. Id. at 729-30.
135. Id. at 732.
136. Id
137. Id at 733-37; see also Shakman et al., supra note 123, at 31 (arguing in support of a
separate breach of fiduciary duty claim when lawyers "misappropriate client funds, commit torts
against clients (other than professional negligence) or take advantage of trust and confidence to
establish sexual relations with clients").
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The duty of care is not a "fiduciary duty," though fiduciaries must
act carefully[.] 13 8

From this, Professor McGowan concluded: "[C]arelessness and
incompetence are not fiduciary breaches, though fiduciaries may act
carelessly and be held liable for doing so. The true 'fiduciary' duty is the
duty of loyalty." 39 Accordingly, "the breach of fiduciary duty cause of
action should lie for disloyal acts, such as profiting from client
information, self-dealing with clients, taking client business
opportunities, etc."l40 To put it another way, it is best to think of clients
as being able to assert two separate claims-a professional negligence
claim when the lawyer has breached his duty of care to the client and a
breach of fiduciary duty claim when the lawyer has violated his duty of
loyalty to the client.
The Restatement, for which Professor Wolfram served as Chief
Reporter, offers a similar view.' It allows a breach of fiduciary duty
claim in only three situations, two of which Professor Wolfram
identified in his article (a conflict of interest and a situation in which the
lawyer takes unfair advantage of a client), and also in the case of a
breach of confidentiality.' 42 The Restatement specifically does not
permit a client to bring a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty where the
client alleges a breach of the duty of competence, such as failing to
file a complaint within the limitations period. According to the
Restatement's view, a client could only bring a professional negligence
claim for such an error.1 4 3

138. dmcgowan, supranote 14.
139. Id; see also FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 102 ("Only some kinds of attorney
default-generally misconduct involving a betrayal of trust and disloyalty-are properly viewed as
breaches of fiduciary duty.").
140.

dmcgowan, supra note 14; see also FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 102-03

("[C]onflicts of interest, misuse of confidential information, lack of candor, mishandling of client
funds or property, overbilling, and failing to follow instructions frequently involve some form of
disloyalty. Thus, those types of conduct are often treated as breaches of fiduciary duty."); Anderson
& Steele, supra note 14, at 249 ("As a fiduciary, an attorney has a duty 'to represent the client with
undivided loyalty, to preserve the client's confidences, and to disclose any material matters bearing
upon the representation of the client."').
141.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 49 (Am.

LAW INST. 2000).

142. Id. § 49 cmt. b. Professor Paula Schaefer previously noted this discrepancy. Schaefer,
supranote 116, at 289 n.222.
143.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§§

48, 52. Professor Sande

Buhai reaches a similar conclusion in her recent article:
As a cause of action, "[a] breach of fiduciary duty occurs when an attorney benefits
improperly from the attorney-client relationship by, among other things, subordinating
his client's interests to his own, retaining the client's funds, using the client's
confidence's improperly, taking advantage of the client's trust, engaging in self-dealing,
or making misrepresentations." A legal malpractice claim, on the other hand, focuses on
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Although the case law remains muddled, some courts have begun to
draw these distinctions.'" These courts recognize that clients should be
able to assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty against lawyers who
breach their duty of loyalty to their client.1 45 Moreover, clients should
not be able to assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on
allegations of mere negligence.' 46
Commentators also largely agree that clients should be able to
pursue traditional equitable remedies for breach of fiduciary duty even in
the absence of other harm.1 47 Thus, Professor Wolfram fully supports the
continued vitality of the "equitable remedies" branch of fiduciary duty
law, under which clients can obtain unique equitable remedies when the
lawyer has acted disloyally.' 4 8 While a professional negligence claim
typically only provides clients with compensation for economic harm,
clients can obtain other remedies under a breach of fiduciary duty
theory.1 4 9 The two most common equitable remedies are fee forfeiture
(also known as fee disgorgement) and imposition of a constructive
the quality of the representation provided by the attorney to her client, as it requires
demonstrating negligence-a showing that the attorney provided legal services at
unacceptable levels of competence.
Buhai, supra note 15, at 586; see also id. at 556 ("[T]he core of fiduciary duty, after all, is
loyalty.").
144. See, e.g., Bronzich v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, No. CV-10-0364-EFS, 2011 WL 2119372,
at *10 (E.D. Wash. May 27, 2011) (breach of fiduciary duty claims focus on "the loyalty owed by
the attorney to the client," while a "legal malpractice claim focuses on the attorney's negligent
performance"); Estate of St. Martin v. Hixson, 145 So. 3d 1124, 1128-29 (Miss. 2014) ("Generally,
attorneys owe to their clients duties falling into three broad categories. First[,] he owes a duty of
care consistent with the level of expertise he holds himself out as possessing. This duty of care
imports not only skill or expertise, but diligence as well. Second[,] he owes his client a duty of
loyalty and fidelity, which includes duties of confidentiality, candor and disclosure. Third, he owes
any duties created by his contract with his client."); see also Wolfram, supra note 2, at 714
("[C]ourts occasionally suggest that only loyalty offenses are included within the concept of
fiduciary breach.").
145. See, e.g., Bronzich, 2011 WL 2119372, at *10; Estate ofSt. Martin, 145 So. 3d at 1128.
146. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 15:3 ("Although the attorney-client relationship
imposes fiduciary obligations, negligent conduct alone usually does not implicate a breach of those
obligations."); see, e.g., Cammarota v. Guerrerra, 87 A.3d 1134, 1143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014)
("Negligence alone is insufficient to support a claim of a breach of fiduciary duty.").
147. Buhai, supra note 15, at 591 ("The law governing lawyers should ... limit[] an attorney's
liability for incompetence or lack of diligence to situations in which his conduct fails to meet
ordinary negligence standards and limiting recovery, in most situations, to compensatory damages.
The law governing lawyers should not, however, so limit causes of action for breaches of duties of
loyalty."); dmcgowan, supra note 14 ("The remedies for disloyalty should be disgorgement of
profits, including fees, earned from disloyal acts. There should be no need for showing causation of
damages to clients, as there is in the negligence context, because the purpose of the claim is to
remove the incentive for disloyal conduct by confiscating the profits of that conduct, not to restore
the client to their position ex ante by compensating their losses.").
148. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 700-01.
149. Id.
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trust. 50 The Restatement of the Law ofAgency'5 s and the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers both provide for such remedies in the event
that lawyers engage in disloyal acts, and the majority of courts have
followed the views of these Restatements.1 5 2
Critically, most courts permit clients to recover these equitable
remedies even in the absence of proof that the violation of the fiduciary
duty caused the client other harm. 5 Professor Wolfram stated: "Fee
forfeiture, in the absence of harm to the client, obviously provides a
remedy with a substantive element quite different from what would
otherwise be available by means of an action for either negligence or
fiduciary breach."l 54 The theory behind this remedy is that the client is
paying the lawyer to be her loyal agent and fiduciary; if the lawyer
breaches a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the client-for example, if he fails
in his role as fiduciary-he does not deserve to be compensated even if
the client has otherwise benefited from the lawyer's work. 5 Moreover,
fee forfeiture is meant to deter disloyal behavior "by depriving the
lawyer of any gain related to the wrongdoing."'56

150. Id. at 700-04.
151.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 469

(AM. LAW INST. 1958) (stating that an agent

is not entitled to compensation when he acts disobediently or disloyally).
152.

Id.

§§

403, 469; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs

§§

6, 37,49 (AM.

LAW INST. 2000); see, e.g., Crist v. Loyacono, 65 So. 3d 837, 842-43 (Miss. 2011) (distinguishing a
professional negligence claim from a breach of fiduciary duty and permitting plaintiff to proceed
with a claim for breach of fiduciary duty claim even without proving that she would have won the
underlying case).
153. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 701-02 ("[C]ourts have not required a client seeking fee
forfeiture to show that the lawyer's wrongful conduct caused the client harm .... ").
154. Id. at 702; see also Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277,
1285 (Pa. 1992) ("Courts throughout the country have ordered the disgorgement of fees paid or the
forfeiture of fees owed to attorneys who have breached their fiduciary duties to their clients by
engaging in impermissible conflicts of interests."); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240, 245 (Tex.
1999) (holding that clients could recover all or part of the lawyer's fees regardless of whether the
clients suffered actual damages as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty); Duncan, supra note 12,
at 1156 ("[P]laintiff [in a fiduciary duty action] may recover any profit realized by the fiduciary
through acts inconsistent with the fiduciary's obligation of fidelity. This policy provides the plaintiff
with the potential to recover part or all of any fee that the fiduciary received for his fiduciary
services .... ); Pollock, supra note 33, at 23 ("Another very real danger for a lawyer who
mishandles her obligations to the client following a mistake is fee forfeiture or disgorgement.").
155. Duncan, supranote 12, at 1156-57.
156. Duncan, supra note 12, at 1157 (stating that the remedy of fee forfeiture serves as a
deterrent "to remove any incentive for the fiduciary to breach his duty of loyalty"); Wolfram, supra
note 2, at 702.
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VI. CLIENTS SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSERT A BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM BASED ON A LAWYER'S FAILURE TO
REPORT His OwN MALPRACTICE
Although (as discussed earlier) a client asserting a claim against her
attorney for failing to self-report his malpractice is unlikely to be able to
assert a cause of action for professional negligence, as I will describe in
this Part, the client should be able to successfully assert a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.'
Not surprisingly, given the jumbled case law, "defining a cause
of action for 'fiduciary breach' continues to be the subject of
judicial examination."' Typically, a plaintiff in a breach of fiduciary
duty claim must establish "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship;
(2) a breach of a duty owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary;
(3) causation of a cognizable injury from the breach; and (4) damages
[suffered by the client]."'5
The attorney-client relationship creates the fiduciary duty.' 60
Properly understood, the primary fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes to
the client is the duty of loyalty.' 6 ' The lawyer's failure to self-report
malpractice constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty. The analysis of
whether a breach of the duty of loyalty is almost identical to the analysis
of whether the lawyer breached the duty of care in a professional
negligence claim.' 6 2 The client should be able to establish-most likely
through expert testimonyl 6 3-a breach of the duty of loyalty. In some
jurisdictions, the client will be able to rely on a breach of Rules 1.7 and
1.4,'" while in other jurisdictions, the client will simply have to rely on
a breach of the lawyer's common law duties of loyalty and
communication.' 65 The argument that the lawyer has breached his

See infra notes 158-75 and accompanying text.
2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 15:4.
159. Id.
157.
158.
160.
161.

See supra Part V.A.
See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text; see also 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra

note 5, § 15:4 (stating that a client should be able to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under
"circumstances that create adversity to the client's interest [and] imperil the duty of undivided
loyalty" and that "[tihese circumstances may consist of an existing, personal adverse interest
of the attorney, an interest of a prior or subsequent client, or conflicting interests of present and
multiple clients").
162. See supra Part IV.
163. 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 33:16 (2006 ed.).
But see Duncan, supra note 12, at 1158 (noting that expert testimony may not always be required
for breach of fiduciary duty claims).
164. See supra Part II.
165. Bronzichv. Persels &Assocs.,LLC, No. CV-10-0364-EFS, 2011 WL2119372, at *10-11
(E.D. Wash. May 27, 2011) (concluding that plaintiffs may not rely on a violation of a
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fiduciary duties follows the same argument concerning the lawyer's
ethical duty: 166 once the lawyer's conduct has given rise to a substantial
malpractice claim by his client, his personal interests are adverse to his
client's, and he has a conflict of interest. 167 Moreover, the lawyer's
lack of candor in failing to disclose the mistake is also a breach of
fiduciary duty.' 6 1

'

The key area that distinguishes a breach of fiduciary duty claim
from a professional negligence claim is the client's ability to recover
certain equitable remedies-principally fee forfeiture-even in the
absence of proof that the violation of the fiduciary duty gave rise to
damages: "[C]ourts have not required a client seeking fee forfeiture to
show that the lawyer's wrongful conduct caused the client harm . ."169
In other words, these equitable remedies are available to the
client without the need to meet the difficult case-within-a-case
requirement. 170 Although there remain some jurisdictional variations, 17
"courts throughout the country have ordered the disgorgement of
fees paid or the forfeiture of fees owed to attorneys who have breached

rule of professional conduct to support a breach of fiduciary duty claim, just as plaintiffs in
Washington State may not rely on a violation of the Model Rules in establishing a professional
negligence claim).
166. See supra Part II.
167. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
168. FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 102-03 ("[C]onflicts of interest, misuse of
confidential information, lack of candor, mishandling of client funds or property, overbilling, and
failing to follow instructions frequently involve some form of disloyalty. Thus, those types of
conduct are often treated as breaches of fiduciary duty."); Anderson & Steele, supra note 14,
at 249 ("As a fiduciary, an attorney has a duty 'to represent the client with undivided loyalty, to
preserve the client's confidences, and to disclose any material matters bearing upon the
representation of the client."').
169. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 701-02; see also Anderson & Steele, supra note 14, at 255-56
("Since breach of a fiduciary obligation is a tort, the normal tort damage remedies are available to
the aggrieved client. However, the client is also entitled to certain extraordinary relief. For example,
an attorney who violates his fiduciary duty is not entitled to any compensation for services rendered
to the client under the retainer contract. Further, an attorney who profits through a breach of his
fiduciary obligation will be held accountable to his client for that profit regardless of whether the
breach caused the client a loss or was in any way at the expense of the client. Extraordinary
equitable remedies such as constructive trust, equitable lien, and rules of tracing are available to the
client to disgorge the profit from the bands of the attorney."); Duncan, supra note 12, at 1156
(stating that these equitable remedies "are available without regard to whether the entrustor has been
injured by the fiduciary's actions").
170. Duncan, supra note 12, at 1156-57; see also 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 5, § 15:5
("Thus in frequent circumstances, such as seeking return or forfeiture of legal fees, wrongs
involving a breach of the duty of loyalty may render irrelevant the merits of the underlying action
and the need for the trial-within-a-trial methodology.").
171.

2 MALLEN & RHODES,supra note 5,
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their fiduciary duties to their clients by engaging in impermissible
conflicts of interests."1 72
The cases that reject an independent claim against lawyers for
failing to self-report malpractice contain a critical analytical error. The
New York cases discussed above, for example, reject the failure to selfreport claims because they are "premised on the same conduct" or "arise
out of the same facts," as the underlying malpractice claim,1" but that is
not true. The underlying malpractice claim is based on one set of facts:
the lawyer missing the statute of limitations, drafting an inadequate legal
instrument, failing to conduct appropriate factual research, or other error.
The failure to report the error to the client is a distinct set of facts.
The New York courts also offer another reason for rejecting an
independent claim-that the client is seeking the same damages for both
the underlying malpractice claim and the secondary failure-to-disclose
claim.1 74 To the extent that the client is seeking the exact same damages,
those decisions are perhaps justified since the claims are then completely
duplicative,' 7 but the savvy client should seek compensatory damages
arising out of the lawyer's underlying malpractice and fee forfeiture (and
possibly other equitable remedies) for the lawyer's disloyalty in failing
to disclose his own error.
VII.

OTHER ADVANTAGES OF BRINGING A CLAIM FOR
A BREACH OF THE DUTY TO SELF-REPORT

In addition to the ability to assert an independent claim for
breach of fiduciary duty seeking disgorgement of fees (and
possibly other equitable remedies), even without causation, there are
several other reasons that a client should pursue a claim for breach of the
duty to self-report.

172. Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1285 (Pa. 1992). The
leading case on fee disgorgement even in the absence of harm is Burrow v. Arce, which holds that a
client could recover all or part of lawyer's fees regardless of whether the client suffered actual
damages as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty. 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 1999); see also
Pollock, supra note 33, at 23 ("Another very real danger for a lawyer who mishandles her
obligations to the client following a mistake is fee forfeiture or disgorgement.").
173. See, e.g., MIG, Inc. v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d
518, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
174. See, e.g., id.
175. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 723.
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Punitive and Emotional Damages

First, a claim asserting a failure-to-self-report malpractice will
enhance the client's chances of recovering punitive damages.' 6 Most
jurisdictions allow legal malpractice plaintiffs to recover punitive
damages,17 7 but courts typically require the plaintiff prove that the
defendant had an "improper intent, typically fraud, malice or
7
oppression.""'
A failure to self-report may open a lawyer to a claim for
punitive damages because of the lawyer's dishonesty in hiding
(or at least failing to disclose) his malpractice,"' and some courts
have awarded punitive damages based on the lawyer's attempt to
conceal his misconduct.s 0
In the Bayview case, for example, the court permitted plaintiffs to
proceed with their punitive damages claim based on the allegations that
"defendants subsequently engaged in a pattern of deliberate conduct that
concealed and exacerbated that original mistake.""' Similarly, in Young
v. Becker & Poliakoff P.A.,182 the Florida District Court of Appeal
found a $2 million punitive damages award was appropriate after the
lawyer failed to take corrective action or tell his client that he had erred

176. The possibility of punitive damages is particularly significant since many malpractice
insurers do not cover punitive damages. Pollock, supra note 33, at 22.
177. 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supranote 163, § 20:16.
178.

Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 53

cmt. h (AM.

LAW INST. 2000) ("Punitive damages are generally permitted only on a showing of intentional or
reckless misconduct by a defendant."); Duncan, supra note 12, at 1147-48 (noting that courts
typically require plaintiffs to prove some form of intentional or reckless conduct in order to obtain
punitive damages). A few jurisdictions prohibit the recovery of punitive damages in legal
malpractice cases. 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 163, § 20:16.
179. Lundberg, supra note 27, at 24-25; Pollock, supra note 33, at 22 ("[A]n ordinary
negligence based malpractice action is generally not going to subject an attorney to punitive
damages. If a plaintiff, however, can pile on allegations that the lawyer breached his fiduciary duties
and in particular concealed his wrongdoing, punitive damages become more likely.").
180. 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supranote 163, § 20:16 ("Sometimes, the allegation is concealment
of misconduct. The lawyer may have failed to inform the client of an error or may have concealed
the error."); see, e.g., Asphalt Eng'rs, Inc. v. Galusha, 770 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)
(permitting client to obtain punitive damages where "[t]he record also supports an inference that
[the attomey] attempted to cover up his misconduct"); Houston v. Surrett, 474 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996) ("[A]n attorney's concealment and misrepresentation of matters affecting his client's
case will give rise to a claim for punitive damages . . . ."); McAlister v. Slosberg, 658 A.2d 658, 660
(Me. 1995) (holding that where the lawyer made intentional misrepresentations conceming the
status of his case, the client was permitted to recover punitive and emotional damages); Metcalfe v.
Waters, 970 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that an "attomey's concealment of wrongdoing
and/or misrepresentations" are relevant to the punitive damages issue).
181. Bayview Loan Servicing v. Law Firm of Richard M. Squire, No. 10-1451, 2010 WL
5122003, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010).
182. 88 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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by failing to attach the right-to-sue letter to the plaintiffs Title VII
complaint, leading to dismissal of the complaint.183
Second, a claim asserting a failure-to-self-report malpractice may
enhance the client's chances of recovering emotional damages. In
considering whether to permit clients to recover emotional damages in
legal malpractice cases, jurisdictions generally apply the same rules that
they apply in all other cases. The Restatement asserts: "In general, such
damages are inappropriate in types of cases in which emotional distress
is unforeseeable."' 84 As with punitive damages, some courts have
permitted clients to recover emotional damages in cases where lawyers
failed to report their malpractice to their clients.' In one case, the court
permitted a client to proceed with a claim-albeit denominated as a
"legal malpractice" claim-based on her lawyer's failure to notify her
that the medical review panel concluded that the statute of limitations
had run."' The court permitted her claim for emotional damages even in
the absence of other damages.'
B.

Statute ofLimitations

Asserting a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on a lawyer's
failure to disclose his own malpractice also has two potential impacts
with respect to the statute of limitations. First, in some jurisdictions, the
statute of limitations is longer for breach of fiduciary duty claims than it
is for professional negligence claims."' If the client brings suit after the
limitations period has run on the professional negligence claim, but
before it has run on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the client, at
least, can obtain whatever remedies are available under that
jurisdiction's breach of fiduciary duty law.' 89

183.

Id. at 1009-10.

184.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 53

cmt. g (AM. LAW INST.

2000); see DePape v. Trinity Health Sys., Inc. 242 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616-17 (N.D. Iowa 2003)
(permitting recovery for emotional damages).
185. See, e.g., Beis v. Bowers, 649 So. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (La. Ct. App. 1995); McAlister, 658
A.2d at 660.
186. Beis, 649 So. 2d at 1096-97.
187. Id. at 1097 (permitting a claim for emotional damages even in the absence of other
damages); McAlister, 658 A.2d at 660 (involving a situation where the lawyer made intentional
misrepresentations concerning the status of his case and holding that the client was permitted to
recover punitive and emotional damages).
188. Duncan, supra note 12, at 1155 ("[S]tatutes of limitations defenses are typically longer for
fiduciary claims than for negligence claims.").
189. 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 15:3 ("If the statutes of limitations are not the
same for the causes of action, the fiduciary breach claim may be essential if a negligence claim is
time barred.").
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Second, an allegation that the lawyer failed to disclose his own
malpractice to his client may toll the statute of limitations on all claims
in the case. Although some jurisdictions only permit tolling of the statute
of limitations when an attorney "fraudulently concealed" facts "by
affirmative misrepresentations," many jurisdictions do not require fraud
or conclude that an attorney's failure to disclose his errors is tantamount
to fraud because of the nature of the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and client.1 90 Some courts have concluded that "because an
attorney is a fiduciary, mere nondisclosure coupled with knowledge of
the cause of action is sufficient to toll the statute." 91
C. Strategic Advantage
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the failure of the lawyer to
self-report is likely to make the lawyer and law firm look bad in front of
the ultimate decision-maker in the malpractice trial and make the firm
more likely to lose the underlying malpractice case. 192 As strong as the
law firm's defense of the underlying malpractice might be, a jury may be
influenced by the lawyer's lack of candor in failing to self-report. 19 3

190. 3 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 23:53; see, e.g., Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn,
P.C. v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d411,413, 416 (Ga. 1998); Bennet v. Hill-Boren P.C., 52 So. 3d 364, 37273 (Miss. 2011).
191. 3 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 5, § 23:53; see also id. ("A duty of disclosure exists
when the attorney's representation continues, and the client's interests can be adversely affected by
nondisclosure. Then, nondisclosure is a breach of a fiduciary obligation, also known as constructive
fraud, which can toll the statute of limitations."); see, e.g., Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP,
167 P.3d 666, 673 (Cal. 2007) ("[A]ttorneys have a fiduciary obligation to disclose material facts to
their clients, an obligation that includes disclosure of acts of malpractice. . . . To the extent current
counsel do breach that obligation, it will do nothing to reduce their own liability, as their own
ongoing representation will continue to toll the limitations period on claims against them... . [This]
creates an additional incentive for counsel to fulfill their fiduciary duties." (citation omitted)).
192. Pollock, supra note 33, at 22-23 ("In the end, all these possible ramifications may be
overshadowed by the simple effect that the lawyer's actions will have on a jury."); see, e.g., Estate
of Re v. Komstein Veisz & Wexler, 958 F. Supp. 907, 927-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Viewed through
the lens of a potential conflict of interest, defendants' otherwise defensible tactical decisions take on
a more troubling gloss, and suggest at least the possibility that defendants' divided loyalties
substantially contributed to [their clients'] defeat . . . .").
193. Shakman et al., supra note 123, at 31 ("[T]he reference to a 'breach of fiduciary duty' has
automatic negative connotations for jurors. The mere fact that a plaintiff has alleged two claims
(breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice) instead of one (legal malpractice) may lead jurors
erroneously to believe that the lawyer's conduct is more serious or that the lawyer is more likely to
have acted improperly. The mere assertion of a claim for conduct that is largely the same as that
covered by the standard malpractice claim should not tip the playing field unfairly.").
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CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that clients should be able to assert two
separate claims against their lawyers-a professional negligence claim
when the lawyer has breached his duty of care to the client and a breach
of fiduciary duty claim when the lawyer has violated his fiduciary duties
of loyalty and communication to the client. 19 4 Applying this to the
failure-to-self-report scenario, clients should be able to assert an
independent claim for breach of fiduciary duty separate from the
underlying malpractice claim, and the client should be able to seek
equitable remedies including fee forfeiture, even in the absence of other
damages."' These doctrinal developments hold important practical
implications for lawyers. First, the fear of an independent claim based on
the failure to self-report should make lawyers think more carefully about
their self-reporting obligations and, in the appropriate circumstances,
report their errors to their clients. The recognition of an independent
breach of fiduciary duty claim may have the salutary effect of causing
lawyers to err on the side of disclosing potentially actionable mistakes to
their clients, thereby improving communication between lawyers and
their clients.
Second, the recognition of separate breach of fiduciary duty claims
should shape legal malpractice litigation. In representing clients in legal
malpractice claims, lawyers will want to cast the defendant's bad acts as
disloyal, thereby opening up the possibility of fee forfeiture and other
equitable remedies. Lawyers on the defense side, on the other hand, will
want to portray legal malpractice claims as ordinary negligence cases,
thereby limiting the lawyer's exposure to equitable remedies.

194. See supra Parts IV-V.
195. See supra Part VI.
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